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OF HEAD TAXES, INCOME TAXES, AND 
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN 
HEALTH CARE 
LAWRENCE ZELENAK* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
This response to Clark Havighurst’s and Barak Richman’s powerful indict-
ment of the distributional effects of the American health care financing system1 
addresses two respects in which they have somewhat overstated their claims.  
First, they argue that the current system imposes an implicit head tax on all per-
sons with employer-provided health insurance, the proceeds of which are used 
largely to provide health care for the uninsured, and that the result of this im-
plicit tax-and-transfer system is a regressive redistribution of income.  However, 
this response explains that once one considers the distribution of the benefits 
financed by the tax, as well as the distribution of the tax burden, the overall sys-
tem is not necessarily regressive.  Indeed, it may well serve to decrease income 
inequality.  Second, they criticize the income-tax exclusion for employer-
provided health insurance as “aid[ing] the moral-hazard enemy.”2  This re-
sponse, however, argues that the core of the current income-tax treatment of 
health insurance—the exclusion from the tax base of the value of basic em-
ployer-provided health insurance—makes good sense from a tax-internal policy 
perspective and is not a health-policy culprit.  Other aspects of the current in-
come-tax treatment of health care expenditures—in particular, the exclusion of 
the value of non-basic employer-provided health insurance, the tax bias against 
non-employer-provided health insurance, and the tax bias against health-
insurance cost sharing—are both bad tax policy and bad health policy, and 
should be reformed.  The core of the exclusion, however, should be retained. 
Both of these comments are in the nature of friendly amendments.  Even 
with the view advanced here that the implicit head tax is not necessarily regres-
sive in its overall effect, the unmasking of the head tax suggests the transfers it 
makes possible should be financed by a tax keyed to ability to pay.  Similarly, 
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 2. Id. at 36. 
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even with the view that the core of the income tax exclusion is justified, much of 
the income-tax treatment of health care costs is in dire need of reform. 
II 
THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF THE HEALTH-INSURANCE HEAD TAX 
According to Havighurst and Richman, hospitals take advantage of their in-
surance-enhanced market power by charging insurers substantially more than 
the cost of caring for insured patients, and the insurers pass on the extra costs to 
their insureds as “a ‘head tax,’ which falls on individuals [with employer-
provided health insurance] without appreciable correlation to wealth, income, 
or ability to pay.”3  The hospitals use these excess payments to finance a range 
of unprofitable activities, most notably, research and development, and provid-
ing uncompensated care to the uninsured.4  Because low- and high-income in-
sureds pay (more or less) the same amount of this quasi-tax, rather than paying 
in proportion to income or wealth, Havighurst and Richman conclude that this 
system of financing health care for the uninsured is regressive.5 
Much of this analysis is correct.  The identification of the disguised head tax 
is persuasive, and it is almost certainly true that lawmakers designing an explicit 
tax to finance health care for the uninsured would not have chosen a head tax.6  
However, the implicit tax-and-transfer system they describe is not necessarily 
regressive.  It is, of course, common usage to describe an income tax as regres-
sive if taxpayers with higher incomes pay a lower percentage of their income in 
tax than do taxpayers with lower incomes.  It is also common to describe a head 
tax as regressive with respect to an income base, because a head tax expressed 
as a percentage of income obviously declines as income increases.  It is a doubt-
ful practice, however, to apply a distributional label to a tax system without re-
gard to the distribution of the benefits financed by the tax.  A tax that would be 
labeled regressive under the usual tax-viewed-in-isolation approach may look 
very different when considered together with the use of the tax’s proceeds.  
Even a head tax may be part of a progressive tax-and-transfer program.  Sup-
pose, for example, a society of just two persons.  Rich has annual income of 
$100,000, and Poor has annual income of $20,000.  Each person is subject to a 
$10,000 head tax, the entire $20,000 proceeds of which are transferred (as a cash 
transfer, as in-kind benefits, or both) to Poor.  The overall effect of the system 
is progressively redistributive, increasing Poor’s after-tax-and-transfer income 
 
 3. Id. at 28.  
 4. Id. at 22–25.  Other important instances of subsidized activities include providing services un-
der Medicare and Medicaid (to the extent the costs of rendering services exceed allowable payments) 
and complying with the unfunded federal mandate imposed on any hospital that maintains an emer-
gency room and accepts Medicare payments to treat emergency room patients without regard to ability 
to pay.  42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2000). 
 5. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 26–27. 
 6. Id. at 28–29. 
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to $30,000, and decreasing Rich’s to $90,000.  Viewed in isolation, the head tax 
may be labeled regressive, but it is part of an undeniably progressive system. 
Havighurst and Richman acknowledge that a complete distributional analy-
sis requires consideration of the benefits financed by the tax, but they summa-
rily conclude that “the manner in which the proceeds are used [does not] appear 
to rectify the apparent regressivity” of the tax itself.7  It is not clear, however, 
that this conclusion is correct.  Of course, the distributional effects of the system 
described by Havighurst and Richman—in which an implicit head tax on those 
with employer-provided health insurance finances health care for the unin-
sured, as well as research and development (R&D)—are considerably more 
complicated than in the hypothetical world of Rich and Poor.  For the moment, 
set aside the portion of the quasi-head tax used to finance R&D and consider 
only the portion of the head tax used to finance health care for the uninsured.  
Viewed in isolation, imposing a tax in the same dollar amount on low- and high-
income workers with employer-sponsored health insurance is indeed regressive.  
On the other hand, transferring money from a higher-income group (those with 
employer-provided health insurance) to a lower-income group (those without 
health insurance) is progressive.8 
How might one determine which effect predominates?  The most common 
measure of the degree of inequality of a distribution of income is the Gini coef-
ficient.9  The Gini coefficient is most easily explained graphically.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7. Id. at 28. 
 8. On the higher income levels of those with health insurance, as a group, than those without 
health insurance, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, P60-229, INCOME, 
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2004, at 25 tbl.7 (2005) (re-
porting that of persons living in households with less than $25,000 of income, 24.3% lacked health in-
surance coverage in 2004; that percentage fell to 20.0% for persons in households with income of 
$25,000 to $49,999, to 13.3% for persons in households with income of $50,000 to $74,999, and to 8.4% 
for persons in households with income of $75,000 or more). 
 9. Corrado Gini, Measurement of Inequality of Incomes, 31 ECON. J. 124 (1921).  For a description 
of alternative measures of inequality (including the Theil index), with a discussion of the advantages 
and disadvantages of the various measures, see JULIE A. LITCHFIELD, WORLD BANK POVERTYNET, 
INEQUALITY: METHODS AND TOOLS (1999), www1.worldbank.org/prem/poverty/inequal/methods/ 
litchfie.pdf.  The example in the text employs the Gini coefficient because it is both the most commonly 
used and the most intuitive of the inequality measures. 
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The horizontal (x) axis in Figure 1 represents percentages of the population, 
while the vertical (y) axis represents percentages of the total income of all 
members of the population.  Any possible income distribution within a society 
can be indicated by a Lorenz curve, showing for the lowest x% of the popula-
tion the y% of total income in the society belonging to that lowest x%.10  The 
straight line, running from the lower left to the upper right, is the Lorenz curve 
of a perfectly equal distribution of income, under which the lowest x% of the 
population always possesses exactly x% of the total income within the society.  
Any inequality of income distribution will produce a convex Lorenz curve, 
touching the line of equality at 0% and 100% of the population and below the 
line of equality at all other points.  The Gini coefficient is the area between a 
society’s Lorenz curve and the line of equality, expressed as a percentage of the 
total area underneath the line of equality.  Thus, if the area between the line of 
equality and the Lorenz curve is A, and the area underneath the Lorenz curve is 
B, the Gini coefficient is A/(A+B).  The higher the coefficient, the greater the 
inequality of the income distribution.  At the extremes, the Gini coefficient for 
a society with a perfectly equal distribution of income would be zero, and the 
coefficient for a society in which all the income is possessed by the single richest 
member would be one.  Whether a tax-and-transfer system is progressive or re-
gressive can be measured by comparing the Gini coefficient of the society in the 
absence of the tax-and-transfer system with the Gini coefficient taking the tax-
and-transfer system into account. 
Applying this sort of analysis to the implicit head tax identified by 
Havighurst and Richman would be a massive undertaking.  It would require de-
 
 10. See Max Lorenz, Methods of Measuring the Concentration of Wealth, 9 PUB. OF THE AM. STAT. 
ASS’N 209, 217–18 (1905). 
Figure 1: The Line of Equality and a 
Hypothetical Lorenz Curve
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tailed information on the income distributions of persons with and without em-
ployer-provided health insurance, on the amount of the implicit head tax, and 
on the distribution of the health care benefits funded by the head tax.  How-
ever, an extremely simplified model, not completely divorced from reality, can 
give some sense of the possible distributional effects of the quasi-head tax and 
the benefits it finances.   
Suppose society consists of eight people with employer-provided health in-
surance and four without.  In the absence of the quasi-head tax, the incomes of 
the people with health insurance would be $200,000, $150,000, $100,000, 
$75,000, $75,000, $50,000, $50,000, and $25,000.  In the absence of benefits 
funded by the head tax, the incomes of the people without health insurance 
would be $50,000, $25,000, $25,000, and $10,000.11  Taking all twelve people into 
account, the society has a Gini coefficient of 0.405689.12  Now suppose a $4000 
benefit for each of the four uninsured persons is financed by a $2000 head tax 
imposed on each of the eight insured persons.  After the tax-and-transfer sys-
tem has its effect, the insured persons have incomes of $198,000, $148,000, 
$98,000, $73,000, $73,000, $48,000, $48,000, and $23,000, while the uninsureds 
have incomes of $54,000, $29,000, $29,000, and $14,000.  The Gini coefficient of 
this new income distribution is 0.392515.  The lower coefficient, after tax and 
transfer, indicates that the head tax and the benefits it funds have decreased the 
inequality in the overall distribution of income.  On these hypothetical num-
bers, the effect of a system of the type criticized as regressive by Havighurst and 
Richman is mildly progressive.  To be sure, the head tax in isolation would be 
regressive.  If the government took $2000 from each of the eight insured per-
sons and tossed the money into the ocean, the post-tax Gini coefficient for the 
population consisting of just the eight insureds would show an increase in the 
inequality of the income distribution.13  This effect is more than offset, however, 
by the equality-promoting effect of transferring income from the more-affluent 
group to the less-affluent group. 
The implicit head tax-and-transfer system described and critiqued by 
Havighurst and Richman does not necessarily reduce income inequality.  With 
some effort, it is possible to construct an income distribution of insured and un-
insured persons for which a particular head tax-and-transfer system would in-
 
 11. Although those without health insurance are poorer as a group, as in the real world there is 
some overlap in the income ranges of those with and without insurance.  See CENSUS BUREAU, supra 
note 8, at 25. 
 12. All Gini coefficient calculations in this paper were done by the author, with the use of the Resa 
Corporation’s Gini coefficient calculator.  P. Wessa, Office for Research Development and Education, 
Free Statistics Software Version 1.1.18 (2006), http://www.wessa.net. 
 13. The Gini coefficient for an eight-person population with incomes of $200,000, $150,000, 
$100,000, $75,000, $75,000, $50,000, $50,000, and $25,000, is 0.323276.  The Gini coefficient for an eight-
person population with incomes of $198,000, $148,000, $98,000, $73,000, $73,000, $48,000, $48,000, and 
$23,000 is 0.330571. 
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crease inequality.14  It is also possible that the portion of the head tax used to fi-
nance R&D increases inequality.15  However, Havighurst and Richman too 
quickly assume that the quasi-head tax they decry is regressive.  When the head 
tax is considered together with the benefits it funds, it is quite plausible that the 
head tax is part of a system that reduces income inequality. 
The above analysis assumes that the proper comparison to the current sys-
tem of implicit head taxes and health care transfers to the uninsured is a world 
in which there are no head taxes and in which the uninsured receive no trans-
fers, either going without health care or somehow paying for it themselves.  Of 
course, starting from a different baseline would change the analysis.  If the al-
ternative to the current system were financing the same health care transfers to 
the uninsured by means of an income tax (with either a flat rate or graduated 
rates) on persons with health insurance, then obviously head-tax financing is re-
gressive compared with that alternative.  Havighurst and Richman adopt this 
perspective when they claim that high-income insureds benefit from the head 
tax “by having the needs of the uninsured . . . met by means other than equita-
ble taxes.”16  It makes more sense, however, to perform the distributional analy-
sis of the current tax-and-transfer system by comparing it with the absence of 
any such system, rather than by comparing it with an alternative system some-
how selected from among an infinite number of possible alternative systems.  
Therefore, Havighurst and Richman’s conclusion that the current system is nec-
essarily regressive is unwarranted. 
At a different level, however, their view of the public-policy implications of 
their head-tax analysis is correct.  Suppose the uninsured currently receive no 
health care, but society has just now decided that persons with health insurance 
are obligated somehow to finance health care for the uninsured.  If the financ-
ing took the form of an explicit tax, it seems overwhelmingly likely that the pub-
lic and Congress would think the burdens of the tax should be distributed 
among insureds not simply on a per capita basis, but with some sensitivity to 
their differing abilities to pay.17  Based on how Congress has decided to distrib-
ute other burdens, the explicit tax might take the form of a mildly progressive 
income tax, or perhaps something less progressive than that but still far from a 
head tax.   
 
 14. For example, suppose a society has three insured persons with initial incomes of $200,000, 
$25,000, and $20,000, and one uninsured person with an initial income of $30,000.  The Gini coefficient 
of the four-person society is 0.495455.  If each insured person is taxed $2000 in order to finance a $6000 
benefit for the uninsured person, the resulting Gini coefficient (for incomes of $198,000, $23,000, 
$18,000, and $36,000) is 0.502727.  The example is a bit rigged, however, because $4000 of the $6000 in 
the tax-and-transfer system is taken from people who are poorer—even before the transfer—than the 
person to whom that $4000 is transferred. 
 15. This depends, of course, on the assumptions one makes about the distribution of the benefits of 
R&D. 
 16. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 29. 
 17. Havighurst and Richman are of this view: “[A]ny projects that public lawmakers would be will-
ing to support would almost certainly be financed in less regressive ways [than a head tax].”  Id. 
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It is almost inconceivable that Congress would come any closer to a head tax 
than the flat rate (2.9%) wage tax currently used to finance Medicare.18  The 
Medicare tax can itself be described, in isolation, as regressive with respect to 
income. Although its rate is flat, and although it applies to all wages (rather 
than only to wages up to the Social Security wage tax ceiling19), the exclusion of 
investment income from the tax base means the rate of tax as a percentage of all 
income tends to fall as income rises.  Nevertheless, income inequality clearly 
would be reduced (that is, the Gini coefficient would fall) if the benefits cur-
rently financed by the disguised head tax were financed instead by a tax mod-
eled on the Medicare tax—as might happen if the existence of the head tax be-
came common knowledge. 
Havighurst and Richman have performed an important service by unmask-
ing the implicit head tax.  The consequence of their exposé might be—and 
should be—the replacement of the implicit head tax with an explicit tax falling 
more heavily on those with more ability to pay.  The accurate claim, however, is 
not that the current tax-and-transfer system is clearly regressive in its overall ef-
fects, but that even if it is progressive it is not progressive enough. 
III 
THE ROLE OF THE INCOME-TAX TREATMENT OF EMPLOYER-PROVIDED 
HEALTH INSURANCE 
A. The Treatment of Health Insurance Under an Ideal Income Tax 
Section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code excludes from an employee’s 
gross income the value of “employer-provided coverage under an accident or 
health plan.”  Havighurst and Richman are critical of this provision for “aid[ing] 
the moral-hazard enemy.”20  Although it is true that some important aspects of 
the current income-tax treatment of health insurance are difficult or impossible 
to defend, excluding the value of basic health insurance from the tax base con-
stitutes sound tax policy and sound health care policy.  Under an ideal (that is, 
normative) income tax, the treatment of health insurance would differ from cur-
rent law in several significant ways, but it would retain the core of the exclusion 
for employer-provided health insurance.  Furthermore, a revised version of the 
income-tax exclusion would not be vulnerable to the criticisms Havighurst and 
Richman level at current law. 
Most tax-policy analysts agree that differences in individuals’ tax liabilities 
(and thus in their shares of the costs of government) should reflect those indi-
 
 18. The 2.9% rate is the sum of the 1.45% tax imposed on employees, I.R.C. § 3101(b)(6) (2005), 
and the 1.45% tax imposed on employers, I.R.C. § 3111(b)(6) (2005). 
 19. See I.R.C. § 3121(a)(1) (2005) (limiting the imposition of the employer and employee taxes to 
finance Social Security benefits to the “contribution and benefit base”). 
 20. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 36. 
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viduals’ differing abilities to pay.21  That is, of course, the beginning rather than 
the end of tax-policy arguments, because it is often debatable how differences in 
individuals’ situations affect their abilities to pay tax.  On one point, however, 
there is widespread agreement:  no one has any ability to pay tax on the amount 
of income necessary to support life at a level of basic decency.  Ability to pay is 
generated only by “clear income”—the amount of income a person has in ex-
cess of subsistence needs.22  If the poverty threshold is, say, $15,000, then no 
one—not even Bill Gates or Warren Buffett—should be required to pay tax on 
his first $15,000 of income.  Historically, Congress has agreed with this view.  
The combination of the standard deduction and the personal and dependency 
exemptions is designed to approximate the official poverty threshold,23 thus ex-
cluding the cost of subsistence from the tax bases of taxpayers at all income lev-
els.  Although in recent years Congress has denied the benefit of personal and 
dependency exemptions to taxpayers near the top of the income distribution, 
this appears to have been a matter of political expediency—a technique for dis-
guising a marginal tax-rate increase for affluent taxpayers—rather than of 
changed principles.24 
Clear-income analysis provides a non-subsidy justification for excluding the 
individualized cost of basic medical care from each person’s tax base.  The costs 
of basic medical care—both basic health-insurance coverage and necessary care 
not covered by insurance—obviously are costs of subsistence.  Thus, just as the 
costs of basic food, clothing, shelter, and transportation should be excluded 
from the tax base, so should the cost of basic medical care.  In the same way 
 
 21. See, e.g., JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 62–64 (3d ed. 2004).  But see 
LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP (2002) (arguing that distributive jus-
tice should be concerned with the distribution of after-tax income, rather than with the distribution of 
tax burdens relative to pre-tax income). 
 22. See, e.g., HAROLD M. GROVES, FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF THE FAMILY 10 (1963); 
Gerard M. Brannon & Elliott R. Morss, The Tax Allowance for Dependents: Deductions Versus Credits, 
26 NAT’L TAX J. 599 (1973); Theodore P. Seto & Sande L. Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay and 
the Taxation of Difference, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1053, 1083 (May 2006) (“[T]here appears to be wide-
spread consensus that . . . some initial portion of every taxpayer’s income should not be subject to in-
come tax.”); Lawrence Zelenak, Children and the Income Tax, 49 TAX L. REV. 359, 361–72 (1994) (dis-
cussing the history and implications of the clear-income concept). 
 23. See S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 31–33 (1986), as reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. 31–33 (indicating that one 
goal of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was to prevent the imposition of the income tax on families at or 
below the poverty level).  Since 1986, the dependency exemption amount has been nearly identical with 
the increase in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) poverty threshold caused by the 
addition of one family member.  For 2006, for example, the $3300 exemption amount differs by only 
$100 from the $3400 amount in the HHS guidelines.  Rev. Proc. 2005-70, 2005-2 C.B. 979, § 3.17; An-
nual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. 3848 (Jan. 24, 2006). 
 24. The phaseout of personal and dependency exemptions for high-income taxpayers is contained 
in I.R.C. § 151(d)(3) (2005).  In 2006, the phaseout begins for married couples filing joint returns at an 
adjusted gross income (AGI) of $225,750, and is completed at an AGI of $348,250.  Rev. Proc. 2005-70, 
2005-2 C.B. 979, § 3.17.  The denial of exemptions to high-income taxpayers is scheduled to be gradu-
ally phased out, with the phaseout beginning in 2006 and to be completed in 2010.  I.R.C. § 
151(d)(3)(E), (F) (2005).  The complete repeal of the phaseout is effective for only one year, however.  
As with all the provisions of the 2001 tax legislation, the repeal of the phaseout is subject to sunset at 
the end of 2010.  Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001 § 901, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 
Stat. 38, 150. 
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that personal and dependency exemptions make the tax system sensitive to dif-
ferences in the cost of subsistence attributable to differences in family size, a tax 
allowance for the cost of basic health insurance should be sensitive to age- and 
sex-based differences in the cost of such insurance.25  Such differences in the 
cost of basic health insurance coverage are significant:  the cost of insurance for 
persons in some age-and-sex categories can be several times the cost for persons 
in other categories.26  If the cost of basic health insurance for a twenty-five-year-
old man is a small fraction of the cost of basic coverage for a woman of child-
bearing age, or for a sixty-five-year-old of either sex, then a universal allowance 
of a fixed dollar amount, akin to the standard deduction, must be too generous 
to the young man or inadequate for the others.27  To the extent that the income-
tax exclusion of employer-provided health insurance removes the age- and sex-
 
 25. The exclusion of employer-provided health insurance does not extend to insurance provided to 
an unmarried domestic partner of an employee unless the domestic partner qualifies as a dependent of 
the employee.  Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1 (2004). 
Because many employers now provide such non-excludable coverage, the IRS has been required to 
explain, in private letter rulings, how taxable employer-provided insurance is to be valued.  In its first 
ruling in this area, the IRS stated that the taxable value of a non-excluded fringe benefit is “the amount 
that an individual would have to pay for the particular fringe benefit in an arm’s length transaction” 
and that, in the health-insurance context, it is “the amount that an individual would have to pay for the 
particular coverage in an arm’s-length transaction (i.e., at individual policy rates).”  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 90-34-048 (May 29, 1990) (citing and applying Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(b)(2)).  The IRS soon changed 
its position, however.  In Private Letter Ruling 91-09-060, the IRS stated that in the case of group 
health insurance “the amount includible . . . is the fair market value of the group medical coverage, 
notwithstanding that the fair market value of the group coverage may be substantially less than the fair 
market value of individual coverage or the subjective value of the coverage to the employee.”  I.R.S. 
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-09-060 (Dec. 6, 1990).  The IRS has adhered to this position ever since.  See, e.g., 
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-31-062 (May 7, 1992); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-17-018 (Jan. 22, 1997); I.R.S. Priv. 
Ltr. Rul. 2003-39-001 (June 13, 2003). 
Although the rulings are not explicit on the point, it is reasonably clear that the IRS contemplates 
that coverage within a particular group has the same value for each covered individual, regardless of an 
individual’s age, sex, or other attributes.  See William V. Vetter, Restrictions on Equal Treatment of 
Unmarried Domestic Partners, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 7 (1995) (reading the rulings in this way).  If this 
is the correct way to value employer-provided health insurance, then I.R.C. § 106 does not actually fea-
ture sensitivity to age- and sex-based differences in the cost or value of health insurance excluded from 
gross income, because there are no such differences in the group-insurance context.  The later private 
letter rulings, however, are clearly inconsistent with general tax principles of valuation and are best un-
derstood as an IRS retreat in the face of political and administrative objections to the application of 
general valuation principles in this context.  It is reasonable for the valuation of taxable employer-
provided insurance to reflect the lower cost of group coverage than individual coverage, but it is not 
reasonable to pretend that group coverage has the same value for a twenty-five-year-old male as for a 
sixty-five-year-old (of either sex). 
 26. Insurers use indices to express how the cost of health insurance coverage varies according to 
age and sex.  An index number of one for a particular age and sex indicates that the cost of coverage for 
a person of that age and sex is the same as the average cost of coverage for the entire insured popula-
tion.  For example, the index for a thirty-year-old man is 0.574, so if the average cost of coverage for the 
entire population is $2000, the cost of his coverage would be $1148.  The index for a fifty-year-old 
woman is 1.762, so the cost of her coverage would be $3524—more than triple the cost of coverage for 
the younger man.  Lawrence Zelenak, A Health Insurance Tax Credit for Uninsured Workers, 38 
INQUIRY 106, 108 (2001). 
 27. Similarly, a fixed allowance cannot distinguish between the person who remains healthy all 
year and so incurs no cost-sharing expenses (that is, co-payments and deductibles) and the person who 
incurs several thousand dollars of such expenses. 
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adjusted cost of basic medical care from the tax base, it is—like the standard 
deduction and the personal and dependency exemptions—part of the definition 
of the ideal income tax base.28  Thus, if a “subsidy” is a provision included in the 
Internal Revenue Code to accomplish some goal other than adjusting tax liabil-
ity to reflect ability to pay (such as encouraging particular types of consumption 
behavior), then because the health insurance exclusion is justified by ability-to-
pay concerns internal to the tax system, it should not be understood as a “sub-
sidy.” 29 
B. Health Insurance and the Actual Income Tax 
Although the “clear income” approach provides a non-subsidy justification 
for the exclusion of basic employer-provided health insurance, in some respects 
current tax treatment of health insurance and other medical costs differs signifi-
cantly from the dictates of clear-income analysis.  The implications of clear-
income analysis are (1) that all costs of basic health care should be excluded 
from the tax base and (2) that no costs of more-than-basic care should be ex-
cluded.  Current tax treatment is insufficiently generous on the first count and 
overly generous on the second. 
On the first count, current law is insufficiently generous because most costs 
of basic health care not covered by employer-provided insurance are not ex-
cluded from the tax base.  People who purchase health insurance outside of the 
employment context may, in theory, deduct their premiums as medical expenses 
under section 213, but the deduction is allowed only to the extent total medical 
expenses exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income (AGI), and even that excess is 
deductible only if the taxpayer itemizes rather than claiming the standard de-
duction.30  In addition, the 7.5%-of-AGI floor applies to basic medical expenses 
not covered by insurance (co-payments, deductibles, expenses for treatments 
 
 28. Of course, if the cost of basic health insurance were built into the standard deduction and the 
exemptions, also providing an exclusion for the actual value of health insurance received from one’s 
employer would amount to two tax-free allowances for the same cost.  It does not appear, however, 
that the cost of basic health insurance is built into the standard deduction and the exemptions because 
the standard deduction and the exemptions do not feature the age- and sex-based adjustments which 
would be required to reflect the cost of basic health insurance.  But see I.R.C. § 63(f)(1) (2005) (allow-
ing a larger standard deduction to taxpayers sixty-five or older). 
 29. To be sure, the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (Staff) lists the exclusion for em-
ployer-provided health insurance, I.R.C. § 106 (2005), as an item in the tax-expenditure budget, thus 
indicating a view of the exclusion as a subsidy.  STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-1-05, 
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2005–2009, at 37 tbl.1, (Comm. 
Print 2005).  This contrasts with the Staff’s “clear income” view of personal and dependency exemp-
tions, as well as the standard deduction, as part of “the normal structure of the individual income tax.”  
Id. at 3.  Although the Staff’s treatment of the entire exclusion as a tax expenditure is dubious, two 
points are worth noting.  First, under current law the exclusion is not limited to the cost of basic insur-
ance, and the Staff is correct that the exclusion of the cost of more-than-basic insurance should be clas-
sified as a tax expenditure.  Second, the Staff has an announced bias in favor of tax expenditure classifi-
cation in debatable cases; the Staff categorizes an item as a tax expenditure whenever there is “a 
reasonable basis for such classification.”  Id. at 2. 
 30. I.R.C. § 213(a) (2005) (imposing 7.5% of AGI floor).  Under I.R.C. § 162(l) (2005), however, 
self-employed taxpayers may deduct their health-insurance costs in full, whether or not they itemize, 
and without the application of any percentage-of-AGI floor. 
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not covered by a taxpayer’s insurance, and all expenses of uninsured taxpayers).  
Under an ideal income tax implementing the clear-income concept, however, all 
such expenses should be deductible in full.31  Although clear-income analysis 
suggests that the tax favoritism for employer-provided health insurance (that is, 
favoritism relative to other health insurance and health costs not covered by in-
surance) is inappropriate, it does not follow that the exclusion is a subsidy.  
Rather, the failure to provide equivalent treatment for other health care costs is 
a sort of penalty, or anti-subsidy. 
On the second count, however, current law is overly generous because it ex-
tends the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance beyond the value of 
basic insurance.32  Under current law, the entire value of employer-provided 
health insurance is excluded from income, even if the insurance covers, for ex-
ample, the excess cost of a single-bed hospital room over a two-bed hospital 
room, longer-than-medically-necessary hospital stays, the cost of experimental 
treatments, or the cost of having a “concierge” primary-care physician.33  Al-
though drawing the line between basic and more-than-basic health care would 
not be easy, the failure to make any attempt to do so under current law means 
the existing exclusion for employer-provided health insurance cannot be fully 
justified by clear-income analysis.34 
C. Moving the Actual Toward the Ideal 
The ideal income tax treatment of health insurance and other health care 
costs can be briefly stated:  The costs of basic health care, and only the costs of 
basic health care, should be excluded from the tax base.  A person who receives 
employer-sponsored health insurance should be able to exclude the value of ba-
sic coverage (however high or low that value happens to be in light of the per-
son’s age, sex, and any other relevant attributes35), and should be able to deduct 
any costs of basic health care not covered by insurance (including deductibles 
 
 31. As described later in this article, under some circumstances health savings accounts (HSAs) 
and health flexible spending arrangements (health FSAs) permit the exclusion from the tax base of 
cost-sharing expenses, without regard to the limits imposed on deductions under I.R.C. § 213.  See infra 
notes 43–50 and accompanying text.  As also described later in this article, however, in many cases 
HSAs and FSAs are not adequate substitutes for an unrestricted deduction for basic health care costs 
not covered by insurance. 
 32. Havighurst and Richman make this point.  See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 36–37 
n.86. 
 33. See Abigail Zuger, For a Retainer, Lavish Care by “Boutique” Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 
2005, § 1, at 1 (describing the trend toward “concierge” personal physicians). 
 34. Although the exclusion of insurance coverage for more-than-basic health care is objectionable 
under clear-income analysis, the exclusion for insurance coverage featuring little or no cost sharing is 
not.  As explained in the text, the entire cost of basic health care should be excluded from the tax base, 
whether that cost consists of (1) the higher cost of insurance with no cost sharing or (2) the sum of the 
lower cost of insurance with high cost sharing and the deductibles and co-payments paid by a person 
with such insurance. 
 35. But see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-09-060, supra note 25 (taking the unreasonable position that the 
value of taxable employer-provided health insurance does not depend on any attributes of the covered 
individual). 
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and co-payments).  To the extent the employer-sponsored insurance goes be-
yond basic coverage, that value should be included in the employee’s tax base.  
A person who purchases health insurance outside of the employment context 
should be allowed to deduct the cost of basic coverage and the cost of any basic 
health care not covered by insurance.  Although a move to this regime certainly 
would constitute a significant change from current law—enlarging the tax base 
in one respect while shrinking it in another—it would retain the exclusion for 
basic employer-provided health insurance at the core of current law. 
Would this revised tax treatment avoid the powerful criticisms aimed by 
Havighurst and Richman at current law?  One complaint—which, as Havighurst 
and Richman note, has been made by many commentators—concerns the 
“greater apparent value [of this tax subsidy] to higher-bracket taxpayers and 
those with the costliest coverage—frequently one and the same.”36  There are 
two parts to this complaint.  First, when a high-bracket taxpayer and a lower-
bracket taxpayer receive identical health insurance and exclude the same 
amount from tax, the tax reduction—and hence the subsidy—is greater for the 
high-bracket taxpayer.  Second, affluent taxpayers frequently receive better and 
costlier employer-provided coverage, and thus are able to exclude more value 
from the tax base.  Havighurst and Richman do not place much emphasis on 
these criticisms,37 but the criticisms merit attention here because of their popu-
larity with other commentators. 
The first part of the complaint is the “upside-down subsidy” critique of 
health care tax policy, a critique closely associated with Stanley Surrey.38  Ac-
cording to this critique, it is unfair that a $1000 exclusion or deduction reduces 
the tax bill of a wealthy taxpayer in the thirty-five-percent bracket by $350, 
while a $1000 exclusion or deduction reduces the tax bill of a middle-class tax-
payer in the fifteen-percent bracket by only $150.  This is a powerful objection 
when the deduction or exclusion in question is a subsidy, but it has no applica-
tion to deductions and exclusions that are an integral part of the definition of 
the normative “clear income” tax base.  Like the standard deduction and per-
sonal and dependency exemptions, the exclusion of the value of basic health-
insurance coverage is not a subsidy at all, and so cannot be an upside-down sub-
sidy.39  If one accepts the argument that basic health care is not part of the nor-
 
 36. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 36. 
 37. Id. at 37 (describing them as “provid[ing], at best, only weak evidence of the pervasive injustice 
we observe in U.S. health care”).  In downplaying the significance of these criticisms, they note that 
“the regressive consequences would be entirely offset if, as is arguably the case, the government re-
places the revenue it loses through such tax expenditures by taxing other income at higher progressive 
rates.”  Id. 
 38. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 134–38 (1973) (expressing this view of de-
ductions and exclusions); see also Harvey E. Brazer, The Federal Income Tax and the Poor: Where Do 
We Go from Here?, 57 CAL. L. REV. 422, 441 (1969) (noting that the tax benefit from a dependency 
exemption of any given dollar amount is greatest for a taxpayer in the highest bracket). 
 39. For criticisms of other attempts to apply the upside-down subsidy critique to adjustments to the 
tax base designed to measure ability to pay, see Zelenak, supra note 22, at 363–65 (regarding depend-
ency exemptions), and Seto & Buhai, supra note 22, at 1093 (explaining that a deduction or an exclu-
04__ZELENAK.DOC 3/7/2007  3:55 PM 
Autumn 2006] OF HEAD TAXES 115 
 
mative tax base because it generates no ability to pay tax, then it makes no 
more sense to say that the exclusion of such health care from the base of a tax 
with progressive marginal rates disproportionately benefits the rich than it 
would to say that the failure to tax people on nonexistent income dispropor-
tionately benefits the rich.  In a footnote, Havighurst and Richman seem to 
agree with this view: “[C]haracterizing the exclusion . . . as a ‘subsidy’ might not 
be appropriate at all, since a taxing authority might simply find it fairer to tax 
individuals’ income only after certain basic necessities were provided for.  But 
the subsidy here is decidedly not limited to . . . only basic coverage.”40  Their 
point seems to be that any exclusion for health-insurance coverage in excess of 
basic coverage is a subsidy and so is vulnerable to the upside-down critique of 
tax subsidies embodied in exclusions and deductions in an income tax with pro-
gressive marginal rates.  This is correct, but the point would be moot under the 
suggested revision of the health-insurance exclusion.  As for the second part of 
the first complaint—that affluent taxpayers are able to exclude from income the 
entire value of the luxury-style health insurance they receive from their em-
ployers, while others are able to exclude only the lower value of their bare-
bones insurance—this is also true.41    Again, however, the point would be moot 
under the proposed limitation of the exclusion to basic health-insurance cover-
age. 
Havighurst and Richman emphasize a different criticism of current law: that 
it “aids the moral-hazard enemy”42 by discouraging cost sharing (that is, de-
ductibles and co-payments) which could combat moral hazard.  The problem is 
that employer-provided health insurance is excluded from the tax base no mat-
ter how large its value, whereas cost-sharing payments generally must be made 
with after-tax dollars.  As noted earlier, cost-sharing payments are potentially 
eligible for deduction as medical expenses under I.R.C. § 213, but medical ex-
penses are deductible only to the extent total expenses exceed 7.5% of a tax-
payer’s AGI, and even that excess is deductible only if the taxpayer itemizes 
rather than claim the standard deduction.  In practice, the vast majority of cost-
sharing payments do not qualify for deduction under I.R.C. § 213.  So, for ex-
ample, if an employer offers its employees health insurance worth $5000 per 
year, with no cost sharing, each employee will exclude the entire $5000 from 
gross income; but if the employer offered employees health insurance worth 
$4000 per year, with expected annual cost-sharing payments of $1000, only 
$4000 of an employee’s health care would be excluded from the tax base.  The 
 
sion, rather than a credit, is the proper tax mechanism if the goal is “to adjust for differences in ability 
to pay”). 
 40. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 37 n.86.  
 41. Notice, incidentally, that this part of the complaint does not depend on the existence of pro-
gressive marginal rates; even under a flat tax it would be inappropriate to subsidize extravagant health-
insurance benefits for the well-to-do. 
 42. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 36. 
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results are a tax-induced preference for health insurance with little cost sharing, 
and increased moral hazard with all its attendant woes. 
As Havighurst and Richman note, the tax bias against cost sharing was sub-
stantially reduced by the introduction in 2003 of favorable tax treatment for 
“health savings accounts” (HSAs).43  Under the new rules, a taxpayer with a 
“high deductible health plan” (HDHP) may make tax-deductible contributions 
to an HSA, and the contributions may be used to pay the taxpayer’s cost-
sharing expenses.44  Limiting these rules to taxpayers with HDHPs is significant 
because an HDHP must feature an annual deductible of at least $1000 in the 
case of self-only coverage.45  With the introduction of HSAs and HDHPs, 
equally favorable tax treatment is available for employer-provided health insur-
ance with no cost sharing and for employer-provided insurance with high cost 
sharing,46 but insurance with moderate cost sharing remains disfavored.  Of 
course, even with the tax bias against HDHPs eliminated, non-tax resistance to 
high levels of cost sharing may persist.  In fact, employers and employees have 
not responded to the 2003 legislation by rushing to adopt HDHPs and HSAs, 
and no rush is expected in the next few years.47  
Although not mentioned by Havighurst and Richman, there is another way 
in which taxpayers may pay their cost-sharing expenses with before-tax dollars.  
At the beginning of a year, an employee may agree to a salary reduction of a 
specified number of dollars in exchange for the employer’s agreement to con-
tribute an equal amount to the employee’s “health flexible spending arrange-
ment” (health FSA).  Cost-sharing expenses incurred by the employee during 
the year can then be paid out of the health FSA, with before-tax dollars.48  The 
 
 43. Id. at 38; see also I.R.C. § 223 (2005) (allowing a deduction for contributions by the taxpayer to 
the taxpayer’s HSA). 
 44.  If the taxpayer’s employer makes contributions to the taxpayer’s HSA to cover the taxpayer’s 
cost-sharing expenses, including contributions made under a salary-reduction agreement, those contri-
butions are excluded from the taxpayer’s gross income.  I.R.C. § 106(d) (2005).  However, the sum of 
deductible and excludable annual contributions may not exceed an inflation-adjusted ceiling amount, 
which is $2700 (self-only coverage) or $5450 (family coverage) in 2006.  I.R.C. §§ 223(b), 106(d) (2005); 
Rev. Proc. 2005-70, 2005-2 C.B. 979, § 3.22. 
 45. The minimum deductible increases to $2000 in the case of family coverage. 
 46. As Havighurst and Richman note, in one respect taxpayers with HDHPs and HSAs receive 
better tax treatment than taxpayers with employer-provided health insurance with little or no cost shar-
ing—contributions may accumulate within an HSA, and no tax is imposed on the HSA’s resulting in-
vestment income.  They accurately characterize this as a “new tax shelter for the well-to-do.”  
Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 39 n.96. 
 47. In a recent survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation, only 2.3% of employers reported offering 
HSA-qualified HDHPs, and only 15% of employees offered that option selected it; the Foundation es-
timated that a total of 810,000 workers were enrolled in HSA-qualified HDHPs nationwide.  KAISER 
FAMILY FOUNDATION, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2005 ANNUAL SURVEY § 8 (2005), available at 
http://www.kff.org/insurance/7315/upload/7315.pdf.  In the same survey, 2% of employers not currently 
offering HSA-qualified HDHPs (including 7% of employers with 1,000 or more employees) indicated 
they were likely to do so next year.  Id.; see also STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 29, 
at 37 (estimating expected tax-expenditure amounts for the five-year period 2005–2009, and indicating 
only $2.7 billion for HSAs over the five years, compared with $493.7 billion for exclusions under I.R.C. 
§ 106 and $44.1 billion for deductions under I.R.C. § 213). 
 48. See I.R.C. § 125 (2005); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-2, Q&A (7) (Mar. 7, 1989); I.R.S., DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, PUBL’N NO. 969, HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND OTHER TAX-FAVORED 
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health FSA is subject to a use-it-or-lose-it rule, however.  If the taxpayer is 
lucky (or unlucky) enough to incur lower cost-sharing expenses than the 
amount of the salary reduction, the unused amount of the FSA is lost to the 
taxpayer forever.  Although hard data are not readily available, it is generally 
assumed that utilization of health FSAs is not particularly high, in part because 
taxpayers are deterred by the use-it-or-lose-it rule,49 in part because of the diffi-
culty of jumping through all the required administrative hoops, and in part be-
cause many employers (concerned about their own administrative burden) do 
not offer the option.50 
The bottom line is, although HSAs and FSAs significantly decrease the tra-
ditional tax bias against cost sharing, they certainly do not eliminate it—in par-
ticular with respect to insurance with moderate levels of cost sharing, and em-
ployees who are put off by the risk and burdens associated with FSAs.  The 
simple and tidy solution, of course, would be to exclude from the tax base cost-
sharing payments incurred in connection with basic health-insurance coverage.  
This would mean the exclusion of employer-paid cost sharing and, more signifi-
cantly, the deductibility—by itemizers and nonitemizers alike, and without the 
application of any percentage-of-AGI floor—of all cost-sharing expenses.  That 
is what is called for by clear-income analysis, and it would fully eliminate tax 
discrimination among various levels of cost sharing. 
Although eliminating the tax bias against cost sharing would lessen moral 
hazard, Havighurst and Richman note that significant cost sharing may have 
unattractive distributional effects.  When rank-and-file employees and higher-
income employees are included in the same pool of employer-provided insur-
ance and provided with nominally the same insurance coverage, conditioning 
eligibility for insurance benefits on a willingness to incur cost-sharing expenses 
 
HEALTH PLANS 12–13 (2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p969.pdf (describing health 
FSAs). 
Arguably, Health Reimbursement Arrangements (HRAs) constitute a third means of paying cost-
sharing medical expenses with before-tax dollars.  If, pursuant to an HRA, an employer reimburses an 
employee (up to a maximum annual amount specified in the HRA plan) for cost-sharing medical ex-
penses, the reimbursement is excluded from the employee’s gross income.  See generally I.R.S. Notice 
2002-45, 2002-2 C.B. 93 (describing in detail the rules applicable to HRAs).  HRA reimbursements 
must be financed solely by the employer; they may not be made pursuant to a salary-reduction agree-
ment.  (Any excess of the ceiling on annual reimbursements over actual reimbursements during the 
year may be carried forward for reimbursements in later years.)  From the employee’s perspective, hav-
ing cost sharing covered by an HRA is the equivalent of having health insurance with no cost sharing at 
all.  For this reason, HRAs are not discussed in the text as a means of obtaining favorable income tax 
treatment for cost-sharing expenses. 
 49. On the complexities of how a fully rational taxpayer should balance the tax savings from health 
FSAs against the use-it-or-lose-it risk, see Franklin Lowenthal and Phillip Storrer, Medical FSAs: An 
Expected Value Analysis, 100 TAX NOTES 521 (2003). 
 50. In a 2003 national survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation, 42% of employees surveyed indi-
cated their employer or their spouse’s employer offered a health FSA option, 49% indicated the option 
was not available, and 9% did not know.  Of those with the option, 34% indicated they participated, 
65% indicated they did not participate, and 1% did not know.  KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, THE 
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION HEALTH INSURANCE SURVEY (2004), available at 
http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/2003-health-insurance-survey-toplines.pdf. 
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is likely to disproportionately discourage rank-and-file employees from seeking 
medical care, with the result that they receive fewer dollars of benefits than do 
higher-income employees.51  This suggests a damned-if-you-do-damned-if-you-
don’t cost-sharing dilemma for employer-provided health insurance.  With low 
cost sharing there is severe moral hazard, but with higher cost sharing there is 
inequity in the distribution of insurance benefits.  Havighurst and Richman of-
fer a way out, however:  combine significant cost sharing with the separation of 
employees into different insurance pools by income groups.52   
Another route to the same goal would be to combine significant cost sharing 
with income-homogenous health-insurance pools outside of the employment 
context.  That approach is not currently practical because of the tax favoritism 
for employer-provided health insurance over health insurance from other 
sources, but that favoritism would be removed under the normative approach to 
the taxation of health insurance proposed here (that is, creating a deduction, 
available to both itemizers and nonitemizers, and not subject to a percentage-
of-AGI floor, for the cost of any purchased basic health insurance).  Adoption 
of this proposal would be sufficient to rescue the tax system from Havighurst 
and Richman’s indictment.  The tax system would no longer create a bias in fa-
vor of employer-provided insurance, and thus would provide no particular en-
couragement to the creation of income-heterogeneous, employment-related in-
surance groups. 
Of course, eliminating the income tax as part of the problem would not nec-
essarily make it part of the solution.  Merely removing the income-tax bias in 
favor of employment-related groups might not cause a flowering of income-
homogenous insurance groups, especially considering that inertia would favor 
the existing income-heterogeneous, employment-related groups.  Some addi-
tional governmental push might be needed if income-homogenous groups are to 
flourish.  One possibility would be to deny the exclusion of basic health insur-
ance (employer-provided or otherwise) from the tax base in the case of income-
heterogeneous insurance groups.  Various non-tax regulatory solutions are also 
imaginable. 
The remaining count in Havighurst and Richman’s indictment of the health 
insurance exclusion is that it encourages rank-and-file workers to devote too 
much of their overall consumption opportunities to health care.53  Because of 
the tax laws, health insurance is received as a fringe benefit of employment, im-
plicitly paid for by a reduction in cash wages.  Because the wage reduction is 
almost invisible to the typical worker, the worker does not realize how much he 
is really paying for health insurance, and so he purchases (so to speak) more in-
surance than he would choose if he received all his compensation in cash and 
had to buy his health insurance with cash.  As Havighurst and Richman explain, 
 
 51. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 43. 
 52. Id. at 45. 
 53. Id. at 55–57. 
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“Precisely because their costs are hidden from them, employees are more likely 
to demand and expect expensive health care even when their true interest 
would be served by economizing.”54  The culprit here is not the exclusion of em-
ployer-provided health insurance from the tax base; rather, it is the inconsis-
tency between the tax treatment of employer-provided insurance and insurance 
obtained from other sources.  By providing equivalent treatment for all basic 
health insurance regardless of source, the proposed revision of the tax laws 
would eliminate the problem identified by Havighurst and Richman—and it 
would do so without changing the current tax treatment of employer-provided 
basic health insurance. 
To sum up, Havighurst and Richman offer a powerful critique of the current 
income-tax treatment of health insurance as the cause of many of the worst 
problems with American health care today.  It does not follow from their cri-
tique, however, that the income-tax exclusion for employer-provided health in-
surance should be repealed.  An ideal income tax, designed to align tax liability 
with ability to pay, would exclude the cost of basic health care from the tax 
base.  Implementing this ideal would broaden the tax base in one way (by 
eliminating the exclusion for more-than-basic employer-provided insurance) 
and narrow it in another (by allowing deductions for purchased insurance and 
for cost-sharing expenses), but it would retain the core of the current exclusion.  
This revised version of the exclusion also would eliminate all the features of 
current law responsible for the effects to which Havighurst and Richman object.  
Interestingly, the recent report of the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal 
Tax Reform would reform the income-tax treatment of health insurance very 
much along the lines of the ideal income-tax model.55  In order to eliminate the 
favorable tax treatment of more-than-basic employer-provided health insur-
ance, the Panel would limit the exclusion to $5000 of insurance value in the case 
of self-only coverage and to $11,500 in the case of family coverage.56  And to 
eliminate the tax bias in favor of employer-provided health insurance over 
 
 54. Id. at 38.  
 55. THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR AND PRO-
GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 78–82 (2005).  The Panel’s stated reasons for 
its proposal resonate with Havighurst’s and Richman’s critique of current law: 
Because of the tax-preferred status of health insurance, people are more likely to buy health 
insurance that provides more coverage than they would in the absence of the incentive.  
Workers who purchase more health insurance may, in turn, use more health services, thereby 
increasing overall health spending.  Estimates are imprecise, but removing subsidies for em-
ployer-provided health insurance could lower private spending on healthcare by 5 to 20 per-
cent. . . . 
. . . . 
The Treasury Department estimates that the Panel’s recommendation to cap the health-
insurance amount at the average premium and provide an equal deduction to all taxpayers 
would reduce the number of uninsured Americans by 1 to 2 million people. 
Id. at 80, 82. 
 56. Id. at 81.  These are “the national average amount[s] projected to be spent on health insurance 
premiums in 2006.” 
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health insurance purchased in the individual market, the Panel also would allow 
a deduction (not subject to any percentage-of-AGI floor) of the cost of such in-
surance (up to $5000 or $11,500).57 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Havighurst and Richman have made an important contribution by uncover-
ing hidden ways in which the current system of health care financing, including 
the income-tax treatment of employer-provided health insurance, has disturbing 
distributional effects.  Their analysis deserves to play a leading role in the na-
tional health care financing debate.  As stated at the outset, the two caveats of-
fered here are in the nature of friendly amendments.  Viewed together with the 
health care for the uninsured that it finances, the implicit head tax on those with 
employer-provided insurance may not be regressive, but it is certainly not pro-
gressive enough.  And although the exclusion for employer-provided basic 
health insurance would not be objectionable under a new-and-improved version 
of the income tax, the treatment of health insurance under the current income 
tax is indeed in need of reform. 
 
 57. Id. at 82.  Given the purpose of equalizing the tax treatment of employer-provided and indi-
vidually purchased health insurance, there appears to be a technical error in the proposal.  In applying 
the $5000/$11,500 ceiling to the exclusion of employer-provided insurance, the proposal seems to con-
template valuing the coverage in the manner currently used by the IRS in valuing taxable coverage 
provided to the domestic partners of employees—by disregarding the effect of the age and sex of an 
insured person on the value of her coverage.  See I.R.S. Prvt. Ltr. Rul. 91-09-060, supra note 25; see also 
supra text accompanying note 25.  Thus, the proposal would exclude the entire value of employer-
provided coverage for all members of an employer group as long as the average cost of coverage within 
the group was within the dollar ceilings, even if the value of coverage for some members of the group 
would exceed the ceilings if the valuation of the coverage reflected age- and sex-based differences.  This 
is reasonable, as it approximates the results that would be achieved under the more theoretically proper 
approach of (1) valuing the coverage taking the age and sex of the insured into account and (2) adjust-
ing the ceiling on the exclusion to take age and sex into account.  The problem arises with respect to the 
treatment of individually purchased coverage, where a twenty-five-year-old-male might be able to de-
duct the entire cost of more-than-basic coverage under the $5000 ceiling, whereas a sixty-five-year-old 
of either sex subject to the same ceiling might not be able to deduct much of the cost of even bare-
bones coverage.  The solution, of course, would be to adjust the deduction ceilings to reflect differences 
in the cost of basic insurance for taxpayers in different age and sex categories. 
